Surprise carries the information: it gives us a reason to update our causal model in the world. In its light, we should reduce our confidence in the controversial faith or in our belief that combat is a peer. The fact that we expect deep differences of opinion shows that this disagreement is predictable in light of our cause-and-effect model. Other assumptions (such as singularity – the idea that the evidence attests to a doxastic attitude) mean that we do not see our contestants as spikes in probability: that is, agents who are so likely to arrive at these issues as we are.14 Although these facts show that profound disagreements do not have the epeetic meaning of usual and extreme differences of opinion. however, they seem troubling. The other side has (in many cases anyway) the markers of peerhood: intelligence, education, reflection and so on and access to the same evidence as us. Doesn`t reaching conflicting conclusions make us pressure to reconcile ourselves in relation to our starting points? Before moving on to our third case, I would like to say that typology offers resources to understand more chaotic business. Of course, ordinary and extreme disagreements are the end of a continuum because the difficulty of the problems is continuous. As a result, the extent to which a dispute is surprising is itself ongoing. It is therefore to be expected that cases in the middle between ordinary differences of opinion and extreme differences are to be expected. In ordinary dissent, because the differences are a little surprising, the best way to restore coherence in our convictions is to reduce our confidence in the proposal on which we are struggling. In extreme disagreements, our confidence in this proposal is far too strong to be easily shaken, but we are less confident that our point of contention is a peer, and the best way to restore coherence is to reduce our confidence in flight time. In more chaotic cases, we are faced with a choice: we could restore coherence, either by diminishing our confidence in the goal proposition, or by peerhood, or by making adjustments in both cases.10 A person may begin with an irrational belief to obtain new relevant evidence of that belief, to react to this new evidence in a perfectly reasonable manner.
and yet, in the end, with an irrational faith.